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Regulation, Barriers to Exit, and the Investment Behavior
of Railroads
Richard C. Levin
Evidence abounds that the railroad industry is in decline. Since World
War II industry profits have remained chronically low, lower than those
of any manufacturing industry in the United States.
1 In the past decade
there have been eight bankruptcies of class I railroads. Although measured
productivity gains have been relatively high, there is good reason to believe
that conventional productivity measures are biased upward in the case of
railroads.
2 More important is the widespread feeling that railroad pro-
ductivity performance has been especially poor relative to latent tech-
nological opportunities. In addition, there are persistent complaints
from customers of the railroads about poor service and maintenance.
For the past two decades most economists have presumed that the
major source of troubles for the railroads has been the regulation of
freight rates by the Interstate Commerce Commission. The familiar
story, given emphasis in the work of Meyer et al. (1959) and retold most
recently by Moore (1975), is that the persistence of value of service
pricing—a legacy of an earlier era of railroad monopoly—induced the
shift of high-valued manufactured traffic from rail to truck, reducing
the volume of railroad traffic and weighting its composition heavily
toward less remunerative traffic in agriculatural and mineral products.
Rate deregulation, it was held, in addition to eliminating the dead-weight
loss from misallocation, would restore the financial viability of the rail-
roads via increased volume. This conventional wisdom has been chal-
lenged by more recent econometric studies (Boyer 1977; Levin 1978)
which suggest that the direct allocative effects of rate deregulation are
likely to be minimal. The low estimated price elasticity for rail transport
implies that both the welfare gains and the traffic shifts attendant upon
deregulation would be small.
This recent work on rate regulation suggests that the major causes
of the railroad problem may be elsewhere. The most plausible candidate,
which occupies a parallel (if not so widely emphasized) strand in the
literature on transport economics, is the burden of excess capacity. The
problem here, long recognized by farsighted railroad executives such as
John Barriger (1956), is that the existing railroad network was designedLevin 182
and built in response to the technological imperatives and locational
patterns of the nineteenth-century economy. The advent of alternative
technologies (trucking and intermodal) and dramatic shifts in the location
of industry and the consuming population have rendered much of the
existing rail plant obsolete, despite traffic growth on other portions of
the rail network.
The longevity of railroad capital alone would be sufficient to create
subnormal profits under such conditions, but the problem has been
exacerbated by regulatory control over the exit of capital. Apart from
the recent abandonments authorized by congressional action in the
restructuring of the northeast rail system, line abandonments require
the approval of the Interstate Commerce Commission. Past abandonment
proceedings have been lengthy and expensive, and the probability of
success before the ICC, though difficult to assess from available data,
may be sufficiently low to deter substantially the efforts of railroad
firms to rationalize their operations.
The problem of excess capacity is exacerbated by rate regulation as
well as by abandonment regulation. The issue here more closely parallels
an aspect of airline rate regulation than the problems usually discussed
in the rail-rate-regulation literature. One of the oldest principles of ICC
rate regulation is that shipments of comparable goods over comparable
distances should be comparably priced.
3 Since the cost of providing
rail service over low-density lines is substantially higher than over high-
density lines, application of this principle has entailed cross-subsidization
of low-density traffic by high-density traffic. It is possible that some
low-density lines would remain viable if rates were allowed to rise to
cover the variable costs of providing service, although in a great many
cases remunerative rail rates would surely induce a shift to alternative
modes.
The combination of barriers to exit and cross-subsidization has adverse
static and dynamic consequences. Statically, the requirement that firms
operate low-density lines (LDLs) lowers industry profits at existing
prices and alters the distribution of profits and losses across firms; to
the extent that LDL traffic could be carried intermodally or by alterna-
tive modes at costs below rail costs, pure waste or productive inefficiency
is induced. Moreover, cross-subsidization entails a dead-weight loss
from misallocation of resources between high- and low-density rail
lines, which is unmeasured by conventional welfare-loss calculations
based on the average discrepancy of rates from marginal costs within
commodity groups and/or distance blocks. Dynamically, the formationExit Barriers and Railroad Investment 183
of new road capital on the viable portions of the rail network is con-
strained, thus retarding the diffusion of superior technology embodied
in capital goods, such as centralized traffic control, automated switching
yards, continuous welded rail, and improved signaling equipment. New
investment is retarded through two distinct mechanisms. First, to offset
the losses on LDLs, rates on HDLs exceed marginal cost, which restricts
output and consequently reduces the desired stock of capital on viable
portions of the rail network. Second, the lower profitability and associ-
ated higher risks of bankruptcy entailed by exit barriers raise the cost
of capital to railroad firms and thus reduce investment.
The object of this investigation is to assess the available evidence for
the existence and magnitude of these effects. The economic literature
on excess rail capacity has focused heretofore on two aspects of the
problem: measuring the extent of excess capacity and estimating the
social cost (in the sense of productive rather than allocative inefficiency)
of operating the rail network at suboptimal traffic density. This study
will present new evidence that bears on the first point, but the static
social costs will be measured only partially and indirectly. Instead, the
focus here will be upon the consequences of abandonment regulation
and cross-subsidization for the profitability, and especially the invest-
ment behavior, of firms in the railroad industry. While the redistributive
consequences of regulation across railroad firms will be emphasized, the
distributive effects of rail abandonments on shippers and local com-
munities (a serious and important issue) will not be discussed.
The Simple Economics of Rail Freight Density
In prior attempts to measure the extent of excess line capacity, Fried-
laender (1971) and Keeler (1974, 1976) estimated short- and long-run
rail cost functions from data supplied by rail firms. Despite important
differences in methodology and functional specification, these authors
reached broadly similar conclusions. Both found that the actual cost of
operating at existing traffic levels substantially exceeds the cost of pro-
viding the same level of service along the long-run cost envelope. In
light of the methods employed by these authors, the latter statement
is equivalent to a finding of excess line capacity, since each author identi-
fies miles of track as the fixed factor of production in the short run.
Keeler finds that minimum cost provision of rail service at 1969 levels
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Figure 4.1 Unit total costs, operating costs, and traffic density.
In other words, if all lines operated at efficient levels of traffic density,
75-80 percent of rail route mileage would have been redundant.
4
Harris (1977) focused directly on the relation of unit rail costs and
traffic density, and despite a different specification of the cost function
his findings are virtually identical to those of Keeler.
5 Figure 4.1 is a sche-
matic picture of the relation of unit costs and traffic density.
6 Unit costs
decline sharply with density, but they become constant once density
reaches approximately 35-40 million annual gross ton-miles per mile
of road.
7 This represents the level of minimum efficient density, and
(roughly speaking) one can think of this as the capacity of a single track
between two points, the fundamental indivisibility in the rail cost struc-
ture. Higher traffic density can be served at approximately constant
cost by adding segments of parallel track and signaling devices. This
picture of economies to traffic density is consistent with the findings of
Borts (1960), Friedlaender (1971), Keeler (1974), and Caves and Christen-
sen (1976) that the long-run production function for railroad services is
linearly homogeneous.
8
By plotting average rail rates on figure 4.1 it is possible to estimate
the break-even level of traffic density.
9 For Harris's cost function (evalu-
ated at the mean average length of haul for firms in his sample) the break-
even density was 7.93 million gross ton-miles per mile of road in 1973.
Keeler's cost function yields an estimate of break-even density of 8.12
million gross ton-miles per mile of road. Since rates do not vary with
traffic density in principle (though they may vary slightly in practice), withExit Barriers and Railroad Investment 185
commodity type and length of haul held constant, it seems reasonable
to infer that profits on traffic carried over lines with density in excess of
roughly 10 million gross ton-miles per mile of road subsidize losses on
traffic carried on lower-density lines. This proposition will be put to a
crude test in the next section.
The observation that rail rates do not cover average total cost on a
particular rail line does not necessarily make that line a candidate for
abandonment. A firm will presumably offer service if rates cover average
variable cost. Economists unfamiliar with railroad costs are inclined to
wonder why this criterion would not be satisfied, since they assume that
decreasing unit costs of rail service are associated strictly with the fixed
cost of road and track, which is sunk. But, as figure 4.1 illustrates, unit
operating costs decline sharply with traffic density. Decreasing average
variable costs are thought to be primarily attributable to two factors:
the fact that low traffic density necessitates shorter trains, which in con-
junction with locomotive requirements and especially labor require-
ments implies higher unit operating cost; and the fact that maintenance
costs are largely independent of traffic density. Harris's estimate of
average operating costs suggests that, at actual 1973 rates, lines with
traffic density below 4.15 million gross ton-miles per mile of road fail
to earn revenues in excess of variable cost. If rates were permitted to
fall to long-run marginal cost, many lines which cover variable cost at
inefficient prices would become candidates for abandonment, at least
from the point of a view of a private, profit-maximizing enterprise.
Figure 4.1 shows that efficient prices (actual prices divided by 1.4) would
cover operating costs where traffic density exceeds 7.03 million gross
ton-miles per mile of road. This figure is close to the level of break-even
density at existing rates.
New Evidence on the Extent of Excess Capacity
Until recently, econometric work on the excess-capacity problem has
been limited to the use of cross-sectional firm data, in which the only
indicator of a firm's freight density characteristics is the quotient of its
total output and its route mileage. A considerably more detailed picture
can now be obtained from data collected by the Department of Trans-
portation in a study mandated by the Railroad Revitalization and Regu-
latory Reform Act of 1976. The DOT data classify each line segment
in the U.S. rail network by the density of its traffic in 1975.
1
0 Although
the DOT is unwilling to release exact density information by line segment,Levin 186
it does place each segment within one of six density categories.
1
1 When
combined with data from the Federal Railroad Administration's network
model, the line-segment-density data permit a tabulation of the distribu-
tion of each railroad's route mileage by density class. The exact traffic
density for each line segment is unknown, but a good approximation to the
distribution of each railroad's output by density class may be calculated
on the assumption that each line segment has a traffic density equal to the
cell mean. Table 4.1 presents this information for class I railroads in 1975.
The percentage of each railroad's route mileage and output in the
lowest three density categories are reported in the LDL columns of table
4.1. These density categories account for all segments below 10 million
gross ton-miles per mile of road, and correspond closely to the break-even
level of density implicit in the estimates of Keeler and Harris. Ten million
gross ton-miles per mile of road is also the closest approximation, though
perhaps a modest overstatement, of the density level below which efficient
rail rates would fail to cover variable costs. These LDLs account for nearly
two-thirds of the route mileage of class I railroads yet they carry only 18
percent of the traffic. Only five of the sixty railroads tabulated have less
than 20 percent of their route mileage in LDLs; twelve railroads have
networks consisting entirely of LDLs. Three of these twelve are bankrupt,
and none of the rest are in good financial health.
The HDL columns of table 4.1 report the share of each railroad's
mileage and output in the highest of the six DOT density categories.
These line segments, which operate at approximately minimum efficient
density, represent only 10.9 percent of class I railroad mileage, yet they
carry over one-third of the nation's freight. It is remarkable that thirty-two
class I railroads have no HDL segments in their networks, and only
one (the small but highly profitable Richmond, Fredericksburg, and
Potomac) has a system composed entirely of HDLs.
It follows by combining the information reported in columns 4 and 6
that the remaining 25.9 percent of the nation's rail network operates at
traffic densities that are remunerative at existing rates but would not be
profitable if rates fell to the level of long-run marginal cost. These lines
of intermediate density carry nearly half (48.2 percent) of the nation's
freight.
Low-Density Lines and Profitability
Before examining the impact of barriers to abandonment and cross-
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attempt to gauge the impact of these regulatory policies on profitability.
If output prices for comparable commodities do not differ substantially
across firms, and if the commodity mix of traffic and other factors deter-
mining revenues and costs are accounted for, one would expect that the
share of a railroad's traffic carried on LDLs would be an important
determinant of interfirm differences in profitability. Indeed, the results
of estimating a cross-section profit equation may be used to provide an
indirect test of the hypothesis that LDLs are cross-subsidized.
Estimating cross-section profit functions is a tricky business. Many of
the well-known pitfalls stemming from systematic differences in the tax
treatment, capital structure, riskiness, or accounting practices across
industries are not relevant when the firms compared are in the same in-
dustry and are governed by a common set of accounting rules. Never-
theless, specification of a profit equation is rendered quite difficult by
the presence of a large number of highly collinear variables that affect
the revenue or cost structure of railroad firms. The results reported in
table 4.2 should therefore be regarded as merely suggestive, since the
parameter estimates are somewhat sensitive to which variables are in-
Table 4.2 Regression results: railroad profitability in 1975. The dependent variable is the
Rate of return on total assets (= [net income plus net interest payments -=- the book value
of assets] x 100). Sample mean = 3.59.
Estimated Standard


















Note: Number of observations = 31; R
2 = 0.4209
a. Percentage of traffic carried on LDLs = (Output on LDLs -=- Total output) x 100.
b. Significant at the 0.05 level.
c. Mean = Mean density of firm's network = Gross ton-miles -=- Route miles.
d. Percentage of agricultural traffic = (Revenue tons of agricultural commodities -f- Total
revenue tons) x 100.
e. Percentage of mineral traffic — (Revenue tons of mineral commodities -r- Total revenue
tons) x 100.
f. Average length of haul, in hundreds of miles.
g. Revenue ton-miles -r- Gross ton-miles.Exit Barriers and Railroad Investment 191
eluded in or omitted from the equation. The pattern of signs and signifi-
cance, however, is less sensitive to the specification.
1
2
The explanatory variable of major interest is the percentage of traffic
carried on low-density lines (PCTLDL), where low-density lines are those
segments below the approximate break-even density of 10 million gross
ton-miles per mile of road. While this variable is significant at the 10
percent level when entered linearly, its significance increases when a
squared term is added to account for a nonlinearity which is readily
apparent from a simple plot of profit rate against PCTLDL. The sign on
the squared term is somewhat surprising, since the shape of the average
cost curve suggests the opposite sign. Nevertheless, it is clear that the
combined effect of the light density line terms is to reduce the level of
profits.
The mean density of the firm's network is included in order to explain
the cost structure more fully. One expects that, given the LDL percentage,
higher average density will be associated with higher profits, at least over
some range. Collinearity between mean density and PCTLDL is less severe
than one might expect (the simple correlation is 0.61), but the coefficients
on mean and mean




Since both rates and costs depend on commodity type, measures of
each firm's commodity mix are included. PCTAG is the share of agricul-
tural and forest products in a firm's total freight tonnage. Since rates on
agricultural products are distinctly lower than on manufactured products
(the omitted variable), the negative sign conforms to expectations. There
is no clear expectation regarding the effect on profitability of mineral
products; while rates are lower than on manufactures, high-volume
operation (especially on coal traffic) suggests lower costs as well. A sim-
ilar ambiguity is involved with average length of haul. Rates and unit
costs clearly both decline with increases in ALH, and it is widely believed
the net effect on profit is positive. The expected sign results in each
estimated specification, but the variable is never significant.
Regional dummy variables were consistently insignificant in a wide
variety of specifications, despite the expectation that firms operating in
the eastern region—with its higher costs and allegedly unfavorable rate
divisions—would prove less profitable than those in the west and south.
The regional dummies are excluded here because of their high collinearity
with ALH and the commodity-mix variables. The final included variable,
EFF, is meant to be a measure of efficient equipment utilization, the ratioLevin 192
of revenue ton-miles to gross ton-miles. It has the expected sign, but it is
statistically insignificant.
The estimated parameters of the profit function may be used to predict
the impact of abandoning low-density lines. The first column of table 4.3
reports the predicted rate of return in 1975 given the existing route
structure of each firm in the sample. The second column indicates the
predicted rate of return when PCTLDL is set equal to zero. The effect is
dramatic. The average rate of return would rise from 3.88 percent to
8.85 percent, with eleven firms earning returns in excess of 10 percent. In
dollar terms, returns to capital of the thirty-one railroads would increase
by $1.4 billion. This figure almost certainly overstates the avoidable
losses recoverable by abandonment. The exercise reported in table 4.3
involves predicting the profitability of each firm on the assumption that
its route structure contains no LDLs. It is implicitly assumed in per-
forming this calculation that firms will save the full cost of LDL service,
but abandonment will in fact only permit firms to save operating costs.
It is not possible to ascertain the precise magnitude of capital costs
associated with LDLs, but Harris's figures suggest they are unlikely to
be more than one-third of total costs. Thus, each firm's predicted gains
should be scaled down by about one-third, and a more plausible estimate
of the profit increase resulting from abandonment would be just under
$1 billion for the thirty-one sample firms. Since the sample firms own
about two-thirds of the industry's capital stock, an extrapolation of this
estimate to the industry as a whole yield a predicted increase in profits
of $1.4 billion. However, private gains of this magnitude would not be fully
realized by abandonment if rates on high-density traffic fell towards
marginal costs through intensified competition or regulatory action.
The profit increases predicted here implicitly assume that rates would
remain constant.
Despite the crudeness of the estimated equation, it seems reasonable
to conclude that the low-density lines are a significant drain on railroad
profitability. The evidence discussed thus far clearly supports the hypothe-
sis that high-density lines are more profitable. To determine whether
LDLs are in fact cross-subsidized, predicted values of the rate of return
were calculated on the assumption that PCTLDL = 1. Under these cir-
cumstances, twenty-four of the thirty-one sample firms would earn
negative rates on return on total capital, which indicates that revenues
would fail to cover variable costs (that is, net income before interest
charges would be negative). All but two of the remaining firms, while
covering variable costs, would nevertheless fail to recover fixed costs.Exit Barriers and Railroad Investment 193
Table 4.3 Effect of low-density-line abandonment on profitability.
Alabama Great Southern





Chicago & Eastern Illinois
Chicago & Northwestern
Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific
Clinchfield
Cincinnati, New Orleans & Texas
Colorado & Southern
Delaware & Hudson
Detroit & Toledo Shore




























































































































These results seem to support overwhelmingly the hypothesis that LDLs
are unprofitable, and to support strongly the presence of cross-subsidiza-
tion in the strict sense.
A Model of Railroad Investment Behavior
To estimate the effects of regulatory constraint on railroad investment
behavior, I shall work within the general framework of the neoclassical
model of investment developed by Dale Jorgenson (1965, 1967, and
others too numerous to mention).
1
4 Though the Jorgenson model has
been subjected to several well-known criticisms,
1
5 it has proved service-
able in a variety of applications and it seems a reasonable starting point.
The novelty in the present application of the neoclassical investment
model is the attempt to take proper account of the institutional peculiar-
ities of the railroad industry. To do so requires specific incorporation of
the regulatory constraint on prices and of the requirement to maintain
service on low-density lines. Moreover, investment in rolling stock should
be separated from investment in road and structures, since both the cost
of funds and the impact of regulatory constraints are different for these two
types of capital.
The results of prior attempts to estimate neoclassical investment
functions from railroad data have been poor, possibly because of a
failure to take account of these special characteristics. Jorgenson and
Handel (1971) estimated a railroad investment function from time-series
industry data. They incorporate price regulation but assumed that prices
are set equal to marginal cost. They failed to disaggregate road and
equipment investment, and did not take account of abandonment regula-
tion and cross-subsidization. Jorgenson and Handel seemed reasonably
satisfied with their results, but they failed to observe that the magnitude of
the theoretically unjustified constant term in their estimated equation
strongly suggests specification error. In the only other attempt to estimate
a neoclassical investment function with railroad data that I know of,
Swanson (1968) disaggregated road and equipment investment. However,
he failed to include any type of regulatory constraint. He claimed only
mixed success for his time-series estimates on individual firms.
The newly available DOT data on line-segment density and the con-
venient separation of road and equipment accounts required by the
ICC make possible the estimation of a model that accounts for the
special features of railroad investment behavior. Using 10 million gross
ton-miles per mile of road as the dividing point, and denoting high- andExit Barriers and Railroad Investment 195
low-density lines by the subscripts 1 and 2 respectively, we can write the
objective function for a firm that seeks to maximize the present discounted
value of its stream of revenues minus expenditures as
Max e'
r\p{Qx + Q2) - w{L, + L2) - ^ + I2) - s(J, +
Jo
(1)
where Q, L, /, and J denote output, labor, gross road investment, and
gross equipment investment respectively; p, w, q, and s are the prices
associated with output, labor, road investment goods, and equipment
investment goods respectively; and r is the discount rate. All variables
are functions of time, but this notation is suppressed. (The objective
function already incorporates one aspect of regulatory behavior: Output
prices are constrained to be equal on high- and low-density lines. Factor
prices, of course, do not depend upon the use to which the factors are put.)
The regulated railroad firm maximizes equation (1) subject to a set of
constraints. First, output on high- and low-density lines is constrained
by the production functions
(2)
F2(L2,K2,E2) -Q2 = 0,
where K and E denote road capital and rolling stock, respectively.
1
6
Rate regulation takes the form of requiring the firm to serve all shippers
at the regulated price. Since each railroad firm faces downward-sloping
demand curves for high- and low-density output in the absence of regula-
tion, we can think of p, a parameter set by the ICC, as determining the
levels of output along the demand curves.
1
7 Thus, the firm's constraint
may be written in terms of output as
& - 6i = o,
(3)
Qi - Q2 = o.
This form of writing the regulatory constraint makes clear that two of
the most widely noted objections to the neoclassical investment model are
irrelevant to the present formulation. First, since the firm is constrained
by demand, it is unnecessary to assume that the production function is
strictly convex. Second, the fact that output is indeed exogenous here
disarms the criticism that output and investment are determined simul-
taneously.Levin 196
A third set of constraints are the growth equations for equipment
capital, in which the change in the capital stock must be equal to gross
investment minus depreciation:
E, - Jx + 6Et = 0,
(4)
E2 - J2 + 6E2 = 0,
where 9 is assumed to be the proportional rate of depreciation of the stock
of equipment capital.
Finally, abandonment regulation enters in conjunction with the growth
constraints on road capital. It is assumed that the exit of road capital is
constrained. That is, Kx and K2 are constrained to be greater than or
equal to zero. If it is further assumed that exit barriers are a binding
constraint only on low-density lines, then K2 = 0. Thus, the growth
equations for road capital may be written as
K, - I, + 5K, = 0,
- I2 + SK2 = 0,
where 5 is the proportional rate of depreciation on road capital.
The constraints (5), as written, imply that road capital on low-density
lines must be replaced as it depreciates. This seems unduly stringent. It
is perhaps more reasonable to assume that barriers to exit are interpreted
as a requirement that gross investment be non-negative. In other words,
the rate of net disinvestment is constrained by the rate of depreciation.
If exit barriers in this sense are a binding constraint for low-density lines,
the growth equations for road capital become
Kx- Ix+ 3K, = 0,
(50
K2 + 3K2 = 0.
The form of our data makes it possible to estimate with some confidence
the model with the constraints (5) imposed, but the alternative specification
involving (5') requires certain ad hoc assumptions, which will be discussed
below. Both versions of the model were estimated.
If we tie together the firm's objective function, (1), with its set of con-
straints, (2)-(5), the Lagrangian expression for a maximum of the firm's
present value may be written as
+ Qi) - ML, + L2) - q{I, + I2) - s{J, + J2)]Exit Barriers and Railroad Investment 197
^F^L^K^E,) - SJ + X2[F2{L2,K2,E2) - Q2]
-
rt*i(Gi - Qi) + e-
rtn2(Q2 - Q2)
i(^i - h + &KJ + 4>2(-l2 + dK2)
J^E, - Jx + OEJ + \I/2{E2 - J2 + 9E2)}dt
= [f{t)dt. (6)
The Euler necessary conditions for a maximum of present value subject
to the eight constraints involve ten pairs of equations (i = 1,2 for all
pairs):
|£ = e~
rtp - A,. - e-'X = 0, (7a)
|J= -e-^-^. = 0, (7c)
K = -c"
rts - ^ = 0, (7d)
df d df , SFj . , - rf , n
(7e)







5£t- rfr oEi 8Ei dt
|f = Ffa^Ed Q = 0 (7g)
- Q-) = o, (7h)
l+5K1= 0,
(7i)
3K2 = 0,Levin 198
—j- = £; — Jt + OEi = 0. (7j)
To interpret these first-order conditions, note that the nh the Lagrange
multipliers associated with the regulatory constraint on output, may be
regarded as the profit on a marginal unit of output, price minus marginal
cost. Thus, we may presume that ni is greater than zero, reflecting the
excess of price over marginal cost on high-density lines, while n2 is less
than zero, reflecting the unprofitability of low-density traffic. This inter-
pretation leads to the natural conclusion that the shadow prices of output
(kx and A2), which from (7a) are equal to e~
r\p — nt), may be under-
stood as the discounted marginal cost of high- and low-density output,
respectively.
The marginal-productivity conditions for the services of road capital
may be derived from (7e) with appropriate substitutions from (7a) and
(7c):
dFt _ q(5 + r - qjq)
(8b)
oKy p — ni
dF2 q3
dK2 p - n2
The right-hand sides of these expressions may be understood as the ratio
of the shadow price of capital services to the shadow price of output. The
numerator of the right-hand side of (8a) may be modified to take account
of the effects of the corporate income tax, as shown by Hall and Jorgenson
(1967). Under these circumstances, we can write the marginal produc-
tivity condition for high density road capital as
(8a') 4r
dKj p — nx
where
c = (1 - k)q\[ <5 + r - l-u) \l-ujq
The parameters k, u, v, w, and x reflect aspects of the corporate tax struc-
ture: k is the investment tax credit, u is the rate of corporate income tax,
v is the proportion of economic depreciation charged against income for
tax purposes, w is the proportion of the total cost of capital charged
against income, and x is the proportion of capital gains charged against
income.Exit Barriers and Railroad Investment 199
The marginal-productivity condition for road capital on low-density
lines differs from (8a) as a consequence of the exit constraint. The implicit
service price of low-density road capital is just its nominal depreciation
q3, since the exit constraint renders the opportunity cost component of
the service price effectively zero.
The marginal-productivity conditions for equipment capital may
similarly be derived from (7f), with substitutions from (7a) and (7d)
yielding
d£ xe + '• - */>\ 12 (9)















The marginal-productivity conditions (8a') and (9') may be solved for
the firm's desired stock of high-density road capital, Xf, and desired
equipment capital, E* and E%. The desired level of road capital on low-
density lines, however, is irrelevant to the firm's investment decision, since
the exit constraint requires that K2 = 0 in the version of the model
incorporating constraint (5). When the alternative constraint (5') is in
force, I2 = 0 as long as the actual level of capital, K2, exceeds its desired
level, iCf. I assume that this is true on light-density lines over the time
horizon under study.
To derive expressions for Kf, E%, and £*, assume that the production
functions for high- and low-density lines have the identical Cobb-Douglas
form:
Qt = Li-'-'KfEf, i=l,2. (10)












The Jorgenson investment model has two components: Expenditure on
replacement investment is assumed to be a constant proportion of the
capital stock, and net investment expenditure at time t is a distributed lag
of changes in desired capital. In the present application, when regulation
requires the replacement of capital on low-density lines, replacement
investment for road capital at time t is simply
1
8
Rt = (SKJt + (3K2)t = SKt. (12)
If all road capital is replaced and net investment in low-density-road
capital is assumed to be zero, the firm's net investment in all road capital,
Nt, is a distributed lag of changes in the desired level of high-density-road
capital:
Nt = It- Rt = tio(AK*)t + fidAKfit-i +••• + /UAK*),_„, (13)
where /^0,ju1,... ,/!„ is a sequence of non-negative numbers which sum to
unity.
1
9 The expression for net investment in equipment corresponds,
except that the distributed lag is expressed in terms of changes in the
desired level of all equipment, AE* + AE* = AE*.
Jorgenson derives his analog of equation (13) from the assumption that
the firm places new orders each period such that its present capital stock
plus outstanding orders equals its current level of desired capital. The
parameters \i{ thus represent the distribution of delivery times—the
fraction /i0 of new orders arrive in the current period, n1 in the next
period, and so forth.
2
0
To complete the model, Jorgenson assumes that the sequence no,...,nn
has a rational generating function. Then the model (13) can be written as
a rational distributed lag function in net investment and changes in
desired capital:
co0Nt + ai.N^, + ••• + comNt_m = yo(AKt)t + y^AKf)^ + •••
t_k. (14)
The restrictions that the nt be non-negative and sum to unity imply a set
of constraints on the cot and y(, which are thoroughly discussed in Jorgen-
son 1966. Without loss of generality, co0 may be set equal to unity. RecallingExit Barriers and Railroad Investment 201
that Nt = I, — SKt and limiting the order of the Wi sequence to 3 and that
of the y( sequence to 2,
2
1 we write the model in its final form:
It = yo(AK?)r + yA^Kn-i - ©i^-i - ^2^-2 + SKt. (15)
Our principal interest is in estimating the parameters of the road-
investment equation (15) and using them to predict the impact of LDL
abandonment on capital formation on the viable portions of the rail
network. Rolling stock is obviously less critically affected by the regulatory
constraint on abandonment, but examination of the marginal-productivity
conditions (11) shows that cross-subsidization does affect the desired
stock of equipment capital. We therefore also estimate an equation for
gross equipment investment, Jt, as a function of current and lagged
changes in desired capital, (A£*)t and (A£ *),_!; lagged net investment,
Mt-t; and the stock of capital, Et:
22
Jt = /0(A£*)r + y\(AE*)t^l - w\Mt^ + 6Et. (16)
Estimating the Model of Railroad Investment Behavior
The parameters of equations (15) and (16) describing road and equipment
investment were estimated on a cross-section sample of annual data on
thirty-two class I railroads for the year 1975.
2
3 Estimation of the model
required data on road and equipment capital stocks, gross and net
investment, and desired capital. In constructing capital stocks for each
firm, book values of net road and equipment capital as of January 1, 1969
were taken as benchmarks. Gross road and gross equipment investment
series for each firm taken from Moody's Transportation Manual were
expressed in real terms using appropriate price deflators.
2
4 From the
benchmark capital stocks and real-gross-investment figures, real capital
stocks and real net investment in both road and equipment for each year
from 1969 to 1975 were calculated annual depreciation rates of 0.04691
for road capital and 0.06907 for equipment. These depreciation rates
were estimated from Department of Commerce (1974) time series on
industry aggregates of fixed railroad structures and railroad equipment.
2
5
Desired capital stocks can be known only up to a multiplicative con-
stant, since the output elasticities of each type of capital, a and /?, are
unknown a priori. Recall from (11) that the expressions for desired capital
are
K* = Kf = «
(
p ~
 n^Q\ (17a)Levin 202
(nb)
Since a and fi are unknown, the model is actually estimated with changes
in K*/OL and E*/fi as independent variables. Thus, instead of using equa-
tions (15) and (16) as written, the empirical procedure is to estimate
(AP -
 n\)Qi\ (
It = yoa[ A^ i^
1 + y,a
\
 c A V
P - ^i
- co.N,^ - co2Nt_2 + SKt (18)
and
- co\Mt^ + 6Et. (19)
As Jorgenson (1966) showed, consistent estimates of production function
parameters may be obtained by application of the formulas a = £y;a/
ZoOi and /? = Zy-^/Zco •.
To measure K*/a and E*/(3 we can use the previously noted empirical
finding of Keeler (1976) and Friedlaender (1971) that the ratio of price to
marginal cost on high-density lines is 1.4. Since p — n may be interpreted
as marginal cost, it follows that p — nx = 0.7lp. Since we know from the
DOT density data the percentage of each firm's output carried on lines
above break-even density we can measure (p — n^Q^ by the product of
0.71, the firm's freight revenue, and the share of its output carried on lines
with density greater than 10 million gross ton-miles per mile of road. For
the equipment equation we need to know p — n2 as well. On the somewhat
dubious assumption that price is set such that profits on high-density
lines equal losses on low-density lines for the rail system as a whole,
p — 7i 2 = 2.32.
The prices of capital services are calculated by Jorgenson's standard
procedure of assuming that capital gains are regarded by firms as transi-
tory. We thus assume that the capital service prices for road and equipment
are
c = (1 — k)qExit Barriers and Railroad Investment 203
Values of c and d were computed for each firm using the depreciation
rates and investment goods prices already discussed and the statutory
rates of corporate income tax and investment tax credit. The parameter v,
the proportion of economic depreciation charged against incomes, was
calculated separately for road and equipment from each firm's income
statement as reported in Moody's. The parameter w, the ratio of interest
payments to the total dollar cost of capital, could not be computed
separately for road and equipment since interest payments are not
disaggregated in the income statements.
An important part of the story is that the cost of capital differs for road
and equipment. Thus, r is measured using the weighted average yield of
the firm's outstanding general purpose bonds (such as mortgage issues
and income debentures), and r is measured using the weighted average
yield of the firm's outstanding equipment trust certificates.
2
6
One final complication must be discussed before empirical results can
be presented: In the railroad industry, direct investment represents only
one means of adjusting a firm's capital stock toward its desired level.
The firm may also adjust its stock of rented capital. Whereas leased or
rented road capital is only a small fraction of the total capital stock,
rented equipment represents a considerable fraction of rolling stock. By
dividing rental payments reported on income statements by the appro-
priate service price of capital, we can impute the stocks of rented equip-
ment and rented road capital. Annual changes in the stock of rented
capital (AKR and AER) are added to the dependent variable (and to
lagged net investment) in the estimation of equations (18) and (19).
The empirical model of investment behavior is completed by assuming
that equations (18) and (19) each contain an additive error term. If the
error term is distributed identically and independently over observations
and independently of the changes in desired capital stock, and if the
estimated equation represents a stable difference equation in net invest-
ment, then the ordinary least-squares estimator is best, asymptotically
normal, and also asymptotically efficient if the constraints implied by the
non-negativity of the sequence [jiij are satisfied. In the present instance,
estimating the model on a cross-section of firms suggests that the assump-
tion of identically distributed errors is unwarranted. When the residuals
of the ordinary least-squares estimates are ranked by firm size (as measured
by freight revenue), the hypothesis of homoscedasticity was decisivelyLevin 204
Table 4.4 Regression results: Investment in road and structures in 1975. The dependent
variable is gross investment plus change in rented capital. All variables are measured in












































a. Significant at the 0.01 level.
b. Significant at the 0.05 level.
rejected by nonparametric Goldfeld-Quandt tests on each of the reported
specifications. Glejser-type regressions of the residuals on various trans-
formations of revenue consistently suggested weighting the investment
regressions by the square root of revenue.
Ordinary and weighted least-squares (OLS and WLS) estimates of the
parameters of the road investment equation are presented in table 4.4.
It is obvious by inspection that weighting has very little effect on the
parameter estimates. It is also reassuring that the estimated parameters
satisfy all the inequality constraints required to ensure the non-negativity
of each element in the sequence of delivery lag coefficients. Moreover,
the stability of the difference equation in net investment and changes in
desired capital is ensured.
2
7
The parameters of the gross investment equation can be used to
calculate a, the elasticity of output with respect to road capital, and the
sequence [/^ describing the form of the lagged response of net investment
to changes in desired capital. The OLS and WLS estimates of a are 0.0227
and 0.0223 respectively. Though there is no reason (given the divergence
of actual and desired capital stocks as well as the output price distortion)
for the estimated value of a to approximate the empirically observed
share of payments to road capital in the value of output, estimates in the
range of 2 percent do seem distinctly low.
2
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The sequence of lag coefficients computed from OLS and WLS estimates
is reported in table 4.5. Each element fi{ may be interpreted as the propor-
tionate response of net investment to changes in the level of desired capital
/periods earlier. In Jorgenson's view, these coefficients reflect the structure
of delivery lags; ^ may also be interpreted as the proportion of orders
placed today that will arrive / periods hence. Hall (1977), however, notes
that the latter interpretation is not necessary to justify the former; net
investment response may reflect a combination of delivery lags and the
placement of orders based on expected future levels of desired capital.
In any case, the relatively rapid response of investment to changes in
desired capital, wherein nearly 60 percent of the total response is effected
within one year, seems quite consistent with Healy's (1954) detailed
institutional description of the railroad investment process.
Since the estimated parameters of our road investment equation are to
be used to predict the impact of altered regulatory policy, it is especially
important to check the estimates for sensitivity to specification error. One
simple check is the addition of an intercept term to the model. Since the
constant term has no theoretical justification, we should be wary of an
intercept estimate significantly different from zero, and we should be
troubled to find the other parameters significantly altered. In fact we find
that the addition of an intercept term produces no significant alternation
in the estimated parameters, nor is the constant itself significantly different
from zero.
Another check is to examine the estimated coefficient on the capital
stock term. If the model of replacement investment is correctly specified,
the estimated coefficient S should not differ significantly from the rate of
depreciation used in calculating the capital stock. In this case, however,
both the OLS and WLS estimates of the replacement rate are significantlyLevin 206
below the depreciation rate of 0.04691. This finding is not surprising in
light of our initial skepticism about the assumption that the entire stock
of road capital on low-density lines is replaced.
An alternative view of replacement investment is that only capital
on high-density lines is replaced, while capital on LDLs is allowed to
depreciate. By imposing the constraint (5'), that gross investment on
LDLs is zero, an alternative investment equation may be estimated
involving the current value of Kt (high-density-road capital) on the
right-hand side. The difficulty in estimating this form of the model is
that K1 is unknown. The DOT line-segment data permit the computation
of high-density-route mileage and output, but the stock of capital asso-
ciated with high-density lines is not known directly. An upper bound may
be placed on K1 by assuming that the proportion of each firm's road
capital invested in high-density lines {Kx/K) equals the proportion of its
output carried on HDLs (QilQ)- Similarly, it seems plausible that the
share of HDLs in each firm's route mileage represents a lower bound on
KJK
29
The alternative investment model was estimated using each of these
proxy measures for the high-density capital stock. The results were some-
what surprising in that none of the coefficients reported in table 4.4. was
significantly altered. The estimated replacement rate remained 0.031, still
significantly below the rate of depreciation used in computing the capital
stock. These results suggest either that the assumed rate of depreciation
is too high or that there is not full replacement of depreciated capital
even on high-density lines. To check the sensitivity of the results to the
assumed 0.04691 rate of depreciation, the alternative capital stock series
was calculated using 0.031 as the rate of depreciation. The model was
then reestimated using each of the alternative assumptions about replace-
ment investment. Even in this form, the estimated replacement rate was
consistently below the assumed depreciation rate, but once again none of
the other parameters of the model differed significantly from the estimates
reported in table 4.4. This failure to adequately model replacement
investment is troubling, but the stability of the remaining coefficients
across alternative specifications is reassuring in that it suggests that using
these parameters in predicting the response to changes in regulatory
policy is not unreasonable.
A final check on the validity of my specification was to estimate the
model with additional terms reflecting changes in desired capital on low-
density lines. In other words, this alternative specification assumes that
there is no constraint on exit. If the model is correct in assuming thatExit Barriers and Railroad Investment 207
Table 4.6 Regression results: Investment in equipment in 1975. The dependent variable is



























































a. Significant at the 0.01 level.
only changes in desired capital on high-density lines affect output, then
the parameter estimates reported in table 4.4 should be unaffected, while
the coefficients on the added terms should be insignificantly different
from zero. This is precisely what happens in the WLS case. In the OLS
case the only exception is that (AXf), has a significant coefficient with
the incorrect (negative) sign.
While our primary interest attaches to road investment^ the parameters
of the equipment investment function were also estimated by both ordinary
and weighted least-squares methods. The estimates, which are presented
in the "unconstrained estimates" columns of table 4.6, fail to satisfy one
of the inequality constraints necessary to ensure the non-negativity of the
distributed lag coefficients [^]. In particular, the constraint y\ > y'0(o\ is
violated. Imposition of this nonlinear constraint with equality required
an iterative estimation procedure to produce the maximum likelihood
estimates reported in the "constrained estimates" columns of table 4.6.
3
0
The constrained estimates are quite similar to the unconstrained estimates.
The hypothesis that replacement investment is proportional to the current
capital stock appears to be supported here, since the estimated 6 in the
OLS and WLS equations is not significantly different from the 0.06907
rate of depreciation used in calculating the capital stock.
One implication of imposing the constraint y[ = y'0co[ is that the
underlying sequence of distributed lag coefficients takes the form ofLevin 208
[1,0,... ,0]. In other words, the results suggest that equipment investment
adjusts fully to changes in desired capital within one year. The data
provide further support for this claim. If the rational distributed lag
structure is replaced by a more straightforward regression of gross
investment on the current capital stock and on current and lagged changes
in desired capital, only the coefficients associated with current values of
independent variables are statistically significant. The finding of full
adjustment within one year is not entirely implausible, since the dependent
variable includes changes in the stock of rented equipment. While the
delivery lag for new rolling stock sometimes exceeds one year, there is
an active rental market. On the other hand, the unusual lag structure
found here may be an artifact of using data from 1975, a slack year for
equipment investment.
Impact of Abandonment of Low-Density Lines on Railroad Investment
There are two distinct mechanisms by which abandonment of LDLs may
stimulate the formation of new capital on the economically viable high-
density portions of the rail network. First, since abandonment would
eliminate the need for cross-subsidization, rates on HDLs could be per-
mitted to fall toward marginal cost. The lower rates would attract addi-
tional traffic and thus raise the level of desired capital.
3
1 Second, LDL
abandonment may lower the cost of capital to rail firms by improving
long-run profitability and reducing the risk of bankruptcy. The lower
cost of funds would bring forth new capital formation.
These two mechanisms can be seen in the context of the algebraic
expression for the firm's desired capital stock:
The former mechanism operates through the numerator of this expression.
With constant returns to scale on HDLs p — nl (which equals marginal
cost) remains constant as both p and nx fall, but the fall in p induces an
increase in (?1; which depends on the elasticity of demand. The latter
mechanism operates primarily through the denominator as a fall in the
cost of capital, r, reduces c, the service price of capital, and thus increases
K*.
32 For convenience we will refer to the former mechanism as the
price effect of abandonment, and to the latter mechanism as the capital
cost effect.
To predict the magnitude of the price effect on new road investment,Exit Barriers and Railroad Investment 209
we need to know the extent to which prices will fall on HDLs and the
elasticity of rail demand. In fact, the magnitude of the price effect on
investment is simply proportional to the product of Ap/p and the elasticity
of demand. Given the divergence of price and marginal cost estimated
by Friedlaender and Keeler (which suggests that Ap/p would be approxi-
mately 0.3), and given the recent demand estimates of Boyer and Levin
(which suggest that average demand elasticities are about 0.3 or 0.4),
it seems reasonable to expect that LDL abandonment would produce
an increase in output (and hence in the desired HDL capital stock) of
approximately 10 percent. Under alternative assumptions about demand
elasticity and price response, the predicted change in the capital stock
would vary proportionately.
Predicting the magnitude of the effect of capital cost on new investment
is a more complicated matter. It remains to establish the point that
barriers to the abandonment of LDLs do in fact raise the cost of capital
to railroad firms. To do so, it is necessary to formulate and test a simple
model of the determinants of the cost of capital. The parameters of the
capital-cost equation may then be used to predict the effect of LDL
abandonment on capital cost, and the predicted capital cost may then be
fed into the investment equation in order to predict the short- and long-
run investment response.
My argument about the cost of capital concerns the perceived riskiness
of various railroad securities and the associated costs of bankruptcy.
Equipment trust certificates are perceived as virtually riskless assets,
presumably because rolling stock is easily disposed of in the event of
bankruptcy. General-purpose bonds secured by road capital or simply
by future income are considerably more risky, since the liquidation value
of fixed railroad property is usually well below its going-concern value
and since the length and outcome of railroad bankruptcy proceedings
are highly uncertain. If this argument is correct, then those factors that
raise the probability of railroad bankruptcy ought to increase the cost of
raising funds to finance road investment through corporate bonds but have
negligible effect on the cost of funds for investment in new equipment.
In a strikingly successful attempt to predict railroad bankruptcies using
discriminant analysis,
3
3 Altman (1973) found measures of long-run pro-
fitability and current solvency to be the most important determinants of
the probability of bankruptcy. His results motivated the specification of
the equations reported in table 4.7, where the percentage of low-density
lines in a firm's network (PCTLDL) is used as a proxy for long-run
profitability and the ratio of net income before fixed charges to fixedLevin 210
Table 4.7 Regression results: Cost of railroad capital in 1975.
Independent Variables
Constant
PCTLDL (= Output on LDLs +
Total output) x 100
PCTLDL
2 x 100
Assets (in hundred million $)
Coverage LE 1 (Net income before
fixed charges -r Fixed charges,
if ^ 1; zero otherwise)
Coverage GT 1 (Net income before
fixed charges 4- Fixed charges,













































a. In this column the dependent variable is weighted average yield on outstanding long-term
corporate bonds. Sample mean = 9.8529.
b. The dependent variable is weighted average yield on outstanding equipment trust certi-
ficates. Sample mean = 9.0072.
c. Significant at the 0.05 level.
d. Significant at the 0.01 level.
charges is employed as a measure of solvency. Separate coefficients were
estimated for high and low values of the solvency measure, since it was
felt that investors would be more responsive to changes in the coverage
ratio when a firm was showing losses than otherwise. A firm-size measure
was added to the equation to explore the possibility that smaller firms
have somewhat greater difficulty in marketing their securities. Finally, the
PCTLDL term is squared to account for a nonlinearity that was apparent
in a simple plot of the data.
The results seem strongly supportive of my hypotheses. The percentage
of low-density lines in a firm's network, which appears from the cross-
section profit estimates to be the most important determinant of long-run
profitability, has a significant positive impact on the cost of capital to
finance road investment. Solvency, another important indicator of the
probability of bankruptcy, has a strong impact over the range where
firms are failing to cover fixed charges. As expected, neither the density
nor the solvency measure has a significant impact on the cost of equip-
ment capital. Firm size, however, does have a small but significant roleExit Barriers and Railroad Investment 211
in reducing the cost of equipment capital. The presence of LDLs signifi-
cantly raises a firm's cost of road capital, but the magnitude of the effect
is rather small. If firms of equal size and solvency are compared, the cost
of capital for a firm with 50 percent of its output carried on LDLs will be
less than one percentage point (0.88 percent) higher than that for a firm
with no LDLs at all.
3
4
Table 4.8 shows the predicted effect of LDL abandonment on the cost
of road capital for each of the thirty-two firms in the investment sample.
The first column shows the fitted value of each firm's corporate bond
rate, given its current route structure. The second column indicates the
predicted bond rate if PCTLDL were set equal to zero. The final column
multiplies the reduction in the bond rate by each firm's stock of road
capital to obtain its implicit capital cost savings from abandonment. The
average reduction in the bond rate is a little under half a percentage
point, but there is good reason to believe this an understatement of the
impact of abandonment. Since abandonment would improve cash flow,
the coverage ratio would improve, producing a further decrease in the
bond rate for those firms currently unable to meet fixed charges out of
current income.
The ultimate effect of LDL abandonment on investment in road capital
is reported in table 4.9. The predictions are based on the WLS estimates
of the parameters of the investment equation, and the OLS predictions
are virtually identical. The short-run-price, capital-cost, and combined
effects reported in the first three columns represent the first-year impact
on investment on the remaining portions of the rail network in the event
of LDL abandonment. The final three columns show the long-run res-
ponse, which is 2.5 times as great if the lags implied by the investment
equation are taken into account. The estimates are of course sensitive to
the assumption of a 10 percent increase in output, and as noted the full
extent of the capital cost effect is likely to be larger than that reported.
The firms in the sample own approximately two-thirds of the road-
capital stock in the industry. If they are assumed to be representative, the
predicted $106 million in new capital formation produced by LDL aban-
donment should be inflated to approximately $160 million for the industry
as a whole. This represents about one-third of the average annual level
of gross road investment undertaken by class I railroads in the United
States over the past decade. By this standard, $160 million would seem
a hefty influx of new investment. On the other hand, it represents only
a little more than 1 percent of the existing stock of road capital, and it is
considerably less, for example, than estimates of the cost of upgrading theLevin 212
Table 4.8 Effect of LDL abandonment on cost of capital.
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roadbed and track along the Boston-Washington corridor to a standard
sufficient to accommodate current best-practice technology in high-speed
passenger transport.
Summary and Conclusions
The evidence presented herein lends considerable support to the
hypothesis that the burden of excess capacity is a primary source of the
unprofitability and the sluggish performance of the U.S. railroad industry.
Analysis of recently compiled DOT line-segment data revealed that
nearly two-thirds of the nation's class I railroad mileage is below or
barely above the break-even level of traffic density at current rail rates,
and a substantial fraction of these lines fail to produce revenues sufficient
to cover variable costs. Interfirm profitability differences were found to
depend upon the proportion of low-density lines in a firm's network, and
our profitability model provided strong support for the hypothesis that
losses on low-density lines are cross-subsidized by profits on lines of
higher density. It was predicted that abandonment of uneconomic lines
would increase railroad industry profits by at least $1.4 billion (in 1975
dollars). Although clearly of the same order of magnitude, this figure is
somewhat smaller than the savings from abandonment predicted with
the cost function estimated by Friedlaender (1971) and Keeler (1974).
The dynamic impact of the burden of excess capacity is somewhat less
dramatic but nevertheless significant. Investment in roadway and struc-
tures was found to be explained well by a model of investment behavior
that specifically incorporated cross-subsidization and a constraint on the
exit of LDL capital. The cost of capital used to finance road investment,
in contrast to the cost of funds raised with equipment trust certificates,
was found to depend on the extent of excess line capacity. LDL aban-
donment, by lowering the cost of capital and by permitting lower rates
on the remaining rail network, would bring forth approximately $160
million in new capital formation, presumably enhancing the growth of
productivity since many of the opportunities for technical change in
railroad operations are embodied in capital goods. Nevertheless, the $160
million capital shortfall produced by regulatory constraint on exit and
cross-subsidization may appear small in contrast to the static losses from
excess capacity.
Thus, my results generally support the view that low-density lines
constitute a serious impediment to the attainment of static and dynamic
efficiency in the railroad industry. The potential improvement in railroadLevin 214
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performance strongly recommends lifting the exit constraints on private,
for-profit railroad firms. If for reasons of distributional equity some form
of subsidy to affected shippers and local communities is desired, a variety
of solutions appears less costly than requiring railroad firms to pay to the
subsidy out of their meager profits. The Railroad Revitalization and
Regulatory Reform Act of 1976 has already lain groundwork to facilitate
the purchase of abandoned lines by state and/or local government with
generous federal subsidies. While this form of subsidization may be
superior to requiring cross-subsidization it would behoove legislators and
rail planners to recognize that subsidizing an inefficient transport mode
(low-density rail movements) is in many (perhaps most) cases distinctly
inferior on efficiency grounds to scrapping the line and subsidizing shippers
all or part of the difference between truck or intermodal rates and rail
rates.
One puzzle remains to be explained. Given the burden imposed on
railroads by low-density lines, one might expect that there would be
persistent efforts to abandon large portions of the rail network, and that
such efforts would be repeatedly rebuffed by the Interstate Commerce
Commission. Instead, over the past decade an average of considerably
less than 1 percent per year of the nation's route mileage has been proposed
for abandonment (aside from the petitions of firms already in bankruptcy).
Moreover, from 1968 through 1976, 97.5 percent of the abandonment
petitions acted upon by the ICC were approved, with the denials involving
only 3.1 percent of the route mileage proposed for abandonment.
3
6 On
first consideration these figures suggest that regulatory barriers to exit are
minimal, and that the railroad themselves are to blame for the persistence
of excess capacity.
The incentives for managers to maintain the size of their firms may
partially explain the reluctance of railroads to seek abandonment. This
explanation has some plausibility for firms composed entirely or in very
large part of low-density lines, where abandonment would actually
threaten the jobs of top management; it is a less compelling explanation
for the behavior of the roughly thirty firms that carry most of the nation's
rail freight. Despite the possible importance of managerial incentives to
keep LDLs in operation, there are several reasons for supposing that
regulatory barriers to exit are considerably more formidable than the
data on abandonment petitions suggest.
First, abandonment proceedings are lengthy and costly, especially when
the petition to abandon is contested by shippers, local communities,
labor unions, and state governments. In a detailed study, Sloss et al. (1974)Exit Barriers and Railroad Investment 217
found that 63 percent of all abandonment petitions filed between January
1968 and December 1970 were approved within six months, 78 percent
within one year, and 96.5 percent within two years. The picture is quite
different, however, when one considers contested cases in which the
decision of the hearing officer or administrative law judge was appealed
to the Finance Division of the Commission. Of the contested cases
between 1970 and 1976, 56.5 percent required more than two years from
initial filing to final decision and 34.8 percent required more than three
years; only 21.7 percent were resolved within one year, and the average
time from filing to resolution was 28.7 months.
3
7 Second, in the face of
strong opposition to abandonment, the probability of a successful petition
diminishes. Of the 23 cases carried to final appeal between 1970 and 1976,
four petitions were wholly denied and two others denied in part. Third,
for a period after 1971 the ICC held that opponents of abandonment bear
the burden of proof in cases where it is clearly established that the annual
volume of rail traffic is less than 34 carloads per mile. Virtually all proposed
abandonments in recent years have met this standard, but the 34-carload
standard covers only about 10-15 percent of the nation's remaining
route mileage—perhaps no more than one-quarter of the total route
mileage that would be uneconomic at rates equal to long-run marginal
cost. Finally, in recent years only firms in or near bankruptcy have
attempted to abandon large portions of their route network, which is
not surprising in view of the ICC's explicit position that the weakness of
a carrier's overall financial position weights in its favor in abandonment
cases. These attempts, especially that of the Penn Central to abandon
one-quarter of its total mileage, leave little doubt that railroad firms are
aware of the unprofitability of low-density lines. Nevertheless, bankruptcy
only improves the probability of success before the ICC; massive aban-
donment in the northeast ultimately required legislation.
The foregoing considerations suggest that railroad firms are willing to
undertake the costly and time-consuming process of piecemeal aban-
donment only when the probability of success is high. In view of the costs
of litigation (recently increased by the court-imposed requirement that
environmental impact be considered in each abandonment case), the
incentive to abandon for a still-solvent firm is probably small unless the
34-carload standard is satisfied and opposition is expected to be minimal.
The barriers to abandonment are also doubtless increased by the piece-
meal nature of the process. The ICC decides cases on a line-by-line basis,
and the potential savings from abandoning a given 10- or 20-mile branch
line may appear small when weighed against the fixed costs of litigationLevin 218
and the uncertainty of opposition. Yet the benefits from abandoning the
sum of many small line segments may be substantial.
3
8 A simplified
regulatory procedure, or, better still, freedom of exit accompanied by
transitional subsidies to ease adverse distributional impact, would be
likely to improve the performance of the railroad industry significantly.
The 4-R Act, in its attempt to speed and simplify the regulatory process
when abandonment proposals meet no opposition and in its recognition
that direct subsidy is superior to cross-subsidy, has taken at least a few
small steps in the right direction.
I am indebted to Daniel Richards for able assistance in research, to Martin Baily for
numerous conversations on the theory of investment, and to David Coppock, Theodore
Keeler, Paul MacAvoy, Richard Nelson, Sharon Oster, Merton J. Peck, Sidney Winter,
and the conference discussants for helpful suggestions. This research was supported by
grants from the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation and the Eno Foundation.
Notes
1. Source: First National City Bank Monthly Letter (various issues).
2. A strong argument in support of this position is put forth in the report of the Task Force
on Railroad Productivity (1973).
3. The issue that has received most attention in the controversy over rate regulation is
that shipments of different commodities over comparable distances are not priced com-
parably despite comparable costs.
4. Friedlaender concludes that 26 percent of rail route mileage was redundant in 1961 —
1963. Her lower estimate may be in part a consequence of her use of an earlier sample
period, but one suspects it is primarily attributable to methodological peculiarities. As
Nelson (1971) pointed out, Friedlaender's estimate of the extent of excess capacity in the
rail system as a whole is rendered somewhat suspect by her implausible finding that eastern
railroads such as the Pennsylvania, the New York Central, Central of New Jersey, Lehigh
Valley, and the Maine Central had a deficiency rather than an excess of line capacity in
1961-1963.
5. Friedlaender does not report sufficient information to permit derivation of the relation
between unit cost and density implied by her cost and production function estimates.
6. Throughout this article density is measured by gross ton-miles per mile of road. This
measure is distinctly inferior to revenue ton-miles per mile of road, since gross ton-miles
includes the weight of engines and freight cars. The use of gross ton-miles was unavoidable
since it was the measure used in the DOT line-segment data on traffic density discussed below.
7. Strictly, Keeler's average-cost curve becomes flat, but Harris's asymptotically approaches
a lower bound at a level that is approximately equal to the flat range of Keeler's function.
8. As Harris aptly notes, there is considerable confusion in the literature between economies
of scale and economies of density. Economies of scale are present when—allowing for
variation in all inputs, including route mileage—increased output leads to falling unit
costs. Economies of density are present when unit costs fall as output increases, with route
mileage held constant.Exit Barriers and Railroad Investment 219
9. Friedlaender and Keeler are in precise agreement about the relation between actual
average rail rates and estimated long-run marginal costs (that is, average costs at efficient
density). Friedlaender found that the ratio of estimated long-run marginal costs in long-run
equilibrium to observed average costs was 0.736 in 1969. If this ratio has remained constant
over recent years, it follows that the ratio of observed rates to long-run marginal cost has
varied within the range 1.385-1.423 since 1969. Keeler (1976) found the ratio to be 1.42
in 1969.
10. The data are reported in tabular form in Final Standards, Classification and Designation
of Lines of Class I Railroads in the United States, Volume II. A computer tape containing
this information and others indicating the mileage of each line segment were supplied to
the author by the Federal Railroad Administration.
















12. Data on the first four independent variables listed in table 4.2 are derived from the
DOT line-segment density data presented in table 4.1. Data on the dependent variable
and the remaining independent variables were taken from Moody's Transportation Manual
1976. The eastern firms under the temporary jurisdiction of the U.S. Railway Association
were excluded from the sample, and a number of other firms had to be excluded on grounds
of insufficient data.
13. When mean and mean
2 are dropped from the regression, the significance of the PCTLDL
terms drops to the 0.10 level but the estimated parameters are virtually unchanged.
14. One might reasonably wonder why an economist trained and employed at Yale would
choose to employ a neoclassical investment function instead of the Keynes-Tobin alternative.
Rest assured that I am most impressed by the suitability of the so-called "q" theory for
my purposes, and indeed I had intented to compare the performance of the two theories
when they are modified to take account of the special characteristics of the railroad industry.
Unfortunately, the data requirements of the q theory (especially the need to measure the
market value of each firm's securities) proved insurmountable, since the equity of many
railroads is held either by other railroads or by diversified holding companies.
15. See, for example, Tobin 1967, Gould 1969, and Brainard 1977.
16. The independence of the production functions for output on high- and low-density lines
is assumed primarily to simplify analysis. While it is not difficult to imagine interdependence
in production, it is not entirely clear how it should be modeled.
17. It should perhaps be noted that, while time notation is supressed, each firm's demand
curves may be shifting over time, and the regulated price may also vary over time.
18. When constraint (5') operates, replacement is simply proportional to the stock of
high-density-road capital, not to the entire stock of road capital; that is, R't = (SK^,.
19. Under the alternative constraint (5'), depreciation on low-density-road capital, (3K2)t,
must be subtracted from the right-hand side of (13).Levin 220
20. I cannot resist commenting on certain defects of the Jorgenson model. The assumed
behavior is peculiarly myopic. The firm acts as if it is entirely ignorant of delivery lags;
it is always adjusting its stock of outstanding orders to its current level of desired capital.
But if the firm knew anything about delivery lags, even probabilistically, one might expect
it to place its orders such that expected deliveries this period (if some orders are filled
immediately) or next period (if that is the minimum delivery lag), plus the actual capital
stock, would equal the actual or expected level of desired capital. Such a formulation leads
to an estimating equation quite similar to Jorgenson's, but with a different interpretation
of the parameters. A second peculiarity is that delivery lags exist only on new investment,
not on replaced capital.
21. Jorgenson (1966) showed that the sequence [JI;] may be approximated to any desired
degree of accuracy with a finite number of parameters, to, and y,. No clear criterion has
been established to determine the preferred number of terms in each sequence of parameters.
I followed Jorgenson's procedure of experimenting with a wide variety of specifications
and choosing that which minimized the adjusted standard error of the regression. Very
little seems to have been lost by limiting the sequences a>, and ]', to three and two terms
respectively; in none of the tested specifications were any higher-order terms statistically
significant.
22. In the model of equipment investment the sequence OJ, is limited to two terms (a»0 — 1
and Wj) by application of the criterion discussed in note 21.
23. Of the 58 class I line haul railroads in 1975,1 excluded the eight bankrupt northeastern
roads involved in reorganization on the grounds that the assumed profit-maximizing
behavior was implausible. Auto-Train and the Long Island Railroad were also excluded
on grounds of noncomparability with ordinary freight-hauling railroads. Sixteen other
firms were excluded on grounds of deficient data.
24. The equipment series was deflated by the wholesale price index for railroad equipment.
There is no comparable WPI deflator for railroad structures, although the ICC developed
an index for road investment that runs from 1914 to 1966. The ICC index has not been
updated, but it turns out to be extraordinarily highly correlated (r = 0.993) in the period
prior to 1966 with the index of purchased materials and supplies (excluding fuel) developed
by the Association of American Railroads. The AAR index was therefore used as a deflator
for road investment.
25. The Commerce Department series on capital stocks and annual depreciation was
constructed using a modified perpetual-inventory method, assuming a distribution of
service lifetimes based on IRS Bulletin F estimates, an initial benchmark, and an industry
series on gross investment. The Commerce Department annual depreciation figures were
regressed on the current capital stock, assuming second-order serial correlation. Experi-
mentation showed that estimated proportionate depreciation rates since World War II
were significantly higher than before World War II, so that the rates used in this study
were derived from regressions run over the period 1947-1972.
26. Computing the cost of capital was a laborious task. Price data reported by Moody's
for many general-purpose bond issues allowed yields to be computed directly. Price data
were often unavailable for some of a firm's rated bond issues; in such cases Moody's
average yield on railroad bonds of identical rating was used as a proxy. Unrated bond
issues were ignored, but they were always a small share of outstanding debt. The directly
computed or imputed yield of each issue was then weighted by its share of the firm's out-
standing general-purpose debt, and the firm's cost of road capital was obtained by summing
over all outstanding rated issues.
For equipment obligations, price data were unavailable. It was therefore necessary to
impute the Moody's average yield for the appropriate rating category to each outstandingExit Barriers and Railroad Investment 221
equipment trust certificate, and compute a weighted average yield for each firm. For some
of the few firms in the sample that had no equipment trust certificates, Moody's reported
data on the terms of conditional sales agreements which permitted assignment of the firm
to a Moody's rating class. A small number of the firms had either no reported equipment
obligations or no general-purpose bonds. For these firms, the missing cost of capital was
imputed by assuming that the firm's differential between equipment and road capital
costs were equivalent to the mean differential of firms issuing both types of obligations.
27. The constraints on y, and co,, as well as the stability condition, are given in Jorgenson
1966.
28. Implausibly low estimates of output elasticity have been reported in every one of
Jorgenson's papers on investment behavior. Jorgenson and Stephenson 1967 suggests that
measurement error may be responsible, but there is no reason to believe that measurement
error would lead to a clear direction of bias. To my knowledge, no convincing explanation
has yet been offered for the apparent downward bias of the output elasticity.
29. In other words, I am asserting that M1/M < K1/K < Qi/Q- This seems plausible since
one clearly expects KJM^ (capital per route mile on HDLs) to exceed capital per mile
on LDLs, because improvements are more likely to have been made on these portions of the
route system. On the other hand, the capital-output ratio on HDLs will be lower than
that on LDLs if there is excess capacity on LDLs.
30. Constrained estimates were obtained as follows. The initial regression equation is of
the form
J, = yoP(AE*lp)t + y\P(AE*/P),_1 - w\Mt_, + 0E, + £,.
Imposing the constraint y\ — y'oa\ and rearranging terms yields
Jt - y'op(AE*/P)t = (oWofcAE'lP),^ - M,^] + 6Et + e,.
For any chosen value of y'op, <x>\ and 6 may thus be estimated by least squares. The value
of >'o)5 that minimizes the sum of squared residuals produces maximum-likelihood estimates
of the parameters given the constraint y\ = y'o co\.
31. One objection to this line of argument is that the traffic gains from lower rates might
be more than offset by the loss of HDL traffic that originated on LDLs. While it is un-
doubtedly true that some (perhaps a large portion) of LDL traffic is fed on to higher-density
routes, it is easy to exaggerate the importance of LDLs as "feeder" lines. In a study of
LDLs outside the northeast, Matzzie et al. (1977) showed that 55 percent of carloads
originating on LDLs contained agricultural products. Since these products are typically
transported by truck to a nearby rail terminal, it is unlikely this traffic would be lost to
the railroads if the trucks were required to go a bit farther to a rail line of efficient density.
Indeed, intermodal transport is probably the least costly alternative for most of the other
commodities originating on LDLs. Moreover, a significant fraction of the potential losses
of feeder traffic is likely to be prevented by state or local takeover of branch lines or by
subsidy to private short-line operators. In sum, the traffic losses on the remainder of the
rail network resulting from LDL abandonment are likely to be small.
32. A reduction in the cost of capital also reduces long-run marginal cost (p — nx), partially
offsetting the effect of the declining denominator. It is easily shown that the decrease in
the numerator is exactly a times the decrease in the denominator, and since a < 1 (in this
case it is about 0.02), an increase in K* is ensured.
33. On the basis of research completed in 1971, Altman proposed ten class I railroads as
"probable bankrupts." Five of the ten—Ann Arbor, Erie Lackawanna, Milwaukee,
Reading, and Rock Island—subsequently filed bankruptcy petitions. Several of the
remaining five are still on or near the brink.Levin 222
34. Several alternatives to the model estimated in table 4.7 were tested. When a direct
measure of current profitability, the rate of return on total assets, was added to the first
equation, it was insignificant and PCTLDL remained significant. When the rate of return
was substituted for PCTLDL, it was statistically significant at the 0.10 level, but the R
2
dropped substantially. I interpret these results as supporting the rather plausible view that
PCTLDL is a better indicator of long-run expected profitability than current level of profits.
35. The cost-of-capital equations were estimated from a larger sample than the investment
equations, because capital cost data were available for some firms that reported insufficient
investment, depreciation, or tax data to be used in the investment sample.
36. Abandonment data are taken from ICC Annual Reports (1969-1976). The percentages
cited omit from consideration the roughly 20 percent of petitions filed that were dismissed
without decision over the same period. Dismissals are usually based on technical grounds
unrelated to the merits of the case.
37. These figures were computed from a survey of all abandonment decisions taken by
the full commission or its finance division as reported in the ICC Reports (volumes 338-346).
I am indebted to Alice P. White for assistance in compiling these data.
38. This line of argument places considerable emphasis on litigation costs. While there is
no solid evidence on the magnitude of these costs, one Conrail official reported that the
costs in terms of legal fees and especially in terms of the diversion of corporate personnel
were indeed substantial. In particular, contested cases involve considerable diversion of
effort by top management to the appeasement of politicians and community and shipper
groups. These direct and indirect costs probably measure in the tens of thousands of dollars
for a relatively minor case. To see that this is not a trivial impediment to seeking abandon-
ment, consider that the average abandonment petition over the past decade involved a
line segment of 17 miles. If litigation costs of such petitions were $50,000-$100,000, the
cost of piecemeal abandonment all LDLs in the system in 17-mile segments would be
$350 million-$700 million.
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John J. McGowan
According to Levin's analysis, eliminating regulatory impediments to
abandonment of low-density lines might increase railroad profits by
about $1.4 billion per year. He suggests that, after such abandonment,
rates on high-density lines would fall toward marginal cost because those
rates would no longer need to generate the sufficient revenues to subsidize
the low-density lines. Lower rates would lead to an increase in output and
the desired stock of capital on high-density lines, and, in addition, aban-
donment would reduce the supply price of capital to railroads. The
combined effect of lower rates and lower capital cost would lead to an
increase in investment (in the long run) of about 106 million 1975 dollars
per year for the railroads in his sample.
Despite the high quality of Levin's economic analysis and econometric
work, I remain troubled by some of his conclusions. To begin with, if the
railroads really could increase profits by $1.4 billion per year, thus more
than doubling their rate of return on total investment, I wonder why they
are not actively pursuing abandonment to the fullest extent. Levin's
explanation is that the transaction cost of pursuing abandonment pro-
ceedings at the ICC and the low probability of success therein reduce
the expected return from pursuing abandonment to almost zero. He also
suggests that management, in its own interest, may attach some utility
to size itself and so does not pursue increased profitability through
abandonment with the vigor that profit maximization might imply. He
may be right about management's tendency to pursue objectives other
than maximum profit, but if so should he not reconsider the theoretical
basis of the investment equations he estimates? He may also be right about
the expected returns from undertaking abandonment proceedings, but I
find his arguments far from persuasive.
First of all, although litigation is expensive, $1.4 billion will buy an
awful lot of it. Hearsay suggests that the services of first-rate law firms
can be purchased at rates approximating $100 per person-hour. If expenses
run at approximately 25 percent of professional services billings, $1.4
billion would buy more than 5,000 person-years of high-quality legal
services. Even allowing for some expert economic testimony, the potential
annual savings would clearly purchase a massive litigation effort. OfMcGowan 226
course, this is an oversimplified analysis. One must consider the prob-
ability of success in estimating what legal effort is warranted by the es-
timated savings of $1.4 billion per year. However, one must also consider
that the probability of success may be an increasing function of the legal
effort, and also that the present value of the savings from abandonment
is the relevant benefit measure, not the annual savings. Perhaps more
important, one should consider the technology for achieving abandon-
ment approval. Levin's discussion assumes that abandonment must be
pursued within the existing ICC procedures for achieving it, and that
legal expenses are incurred in that context. However, if the benefits
through abandonment are as large as he estimates, would not firms
explore alternative technologies for achieving abandonment, such as
bypassing ICC procedures through promotion of superseding legislation?
If Levin's explanation for railroads' lack of vigor in pursuing abandon-
ments is faulty, is there any reason to suspect that his estimates are overly
optimistic? I am not enough of a railroad buff to offer solid evidence on
this score, but one possibility is that Levin's approach assumes that profits
on high-density lines would be unaffected by abandoning low-density
lines. It seems at least conceivable that, by abandoning low-density lines,
railroads would lose business over high-density lines to the competing
intra- or intermodal competitors, who would then originate or terminate
some shipments.
Levin suggests that his $1.4 billion figure may be an overestimate
because regulators might take back some of the increased profits by
forcing rate reductions on the high-density lines. Casual inspection of
the data presented by Levin suggests that this might not be a likely
explanation for the failure of railroads to pursue abandonments more
vigorously. Table 4.3 indicates that after abandonment of low-density
lines the firms in his sample would have an average rate of return on
assets of 8.85 percent, while according to table 4.8 the cost of capital for
firms in his sample after low-density-line abandonment would have a
cost of capital on the average of 9.49 percent. Since it seems unlikely
that regulation would force rate reductions when the rate of return on
assets is below the cost of capital, it does not seem from Levin's data
that, on average, the fear of regulation-enforced rate reductions reduces
the prospective benefits from abandoning low-density lines. Closer
inspection of tables 4.3 and 4.8 indicates that twenty-six railroads appear
in both tables. For thirteen of them, the rate of return after abandoning
low-density lines as shown in table 4.3 would still be below their cost
of capital after abandoning low-density lines, which appears in table 4.8.Comment on Levin 227
(They are the following: Atcheson, Topeka & Santa Fe; Baltimore &
Ohio; Burlington Northern; Chicago & East Illinois; Chicago, Rock
Island & Pacific; Cincinnati, New Orleans & Texas; Detroit & Toledo
Shore; Louisville & Nashville; Missouri Pacific; Norfolk & Western;
Southern Pacific; Texas & Pacific; and Union Pacific.) According to
the last column of table 4.3, these railroads account for $793 million of
Levin's estimated $1.4 billion of the increased profits due to low-density-
line abandonment. Accepting Levin's overall estimate, it appears that
railroad profits could be increased by about at least $800 million through
abandonment of low-density lines.
Would there in fact be any incentive for the abandoning railroads to
increase investment on their high-density lines? In general, Levin estimates
that investment will increase both because rates will fall and because the
cost of capital will fall as a result of abandonment of low-density lines.
However, if we recall that the thirteen railroads that account for the $800
million increase in profit due to abandonment would, even after aban-
donment, be earning rates of return on capital lower than their costs of
capital, I fail to see why they would have any incentive to reduce prices.
Thus, I do not believe that the approximately $55 million cumulative
increase in annual investment that Levin estimates would be undertaken
by these railroads because of lower prices would ever materialize. In sum,
it appears that even if we accept Levin's estimate of the potential for
increasing profits through abandonment of low-density lines, the effect
of abandonment on investment would be somewhat less than one-half
of the approximately $106 million per year he estimates in the long run.Comment
Almarin Phillips
Professor Levin has provided a stimulating and provocative paper. His
attack on the conventional wisdom regarding the source of railroad
problems is, indeed, quite persuasive. The argument moves smoothly
among facts, theory, and econometrics—so smoothly that just a few
critical comments seem in order.
It is not clear, as Levin implies in his discussion and assumes explicitly
in equation (1) of his model, that value-of-service pricing, price discrimi-
nation, and cross-subsidization are so bad. One would suppose that,
in general, the low-density lines have higher demand elasticities than do
the high-density lines. It is quite clear that few railroads are currently
pressing on a rate-of-return constraint. This brings into question the
impact of the "principle" that "shipments of comparable goods over
comparable distances should be comparably priced."
If one takes at all seriously the theory of Ramsey-type pricing, there
are reasons to suspect that this nondiscrimination regulatory constraint
is, along with abandonment, an important source of railroads' problems.
In the context of general second-best theory—and with some important
limitations involving externalities, cross-elasticities, and a defined set of
goods whose prices are regulated—W. J. Baumol and D. P. Bradford
have shown that an inverse elasticity rule applies ("Optimal Departures
from Marginal Cost Pricing," American Economic Review 60 [1970]:
265-283; see also Baumol, "Quasi-Optimality: The Welfare Price of a
Nondiscriminatory Price System," in Pricing in Regulated Industries:
Theory and Application, ed. J. T. Wenders [Denver: Mountain States
Telephone and Telegraph Co., 1977]). Until the rate-of-return constraint
is satisfied, outputs of the several goods—in this case, transportation of
goods among origin and destination pairs—should be reduced propor-
tionately from their respective price-equals-marginal-cost (P — MC)
points. Prices charged would then vary inversely with demand elasticities.
If (as seems to be the case with railroads) the return constraint does not
become binding up to the point of profit maximization, we are left with
a second-best welfare condition with marginal cost equal to marginal
revenue {MC — MR) across the goods in question.
Hesitation in the practical application of this theory is obviouslyComment on Levin 229
necessary, but so is hesitation in pursuing a free abandonment policy
when nondiscriminatory pricing is an operational constraint. Whether
it is called cross-subsidization or not, there may be genuine welfare
reasons for charging different rates for the same goods over comparable
distances.
If this is correct, Levin's conclusions about the differences in investment
with and without abandonment are questionable. Ramsey-type price
discrimination—keeping those lines where P > MC, even though there
is a bookkeeping loss—would improve carrier rates of return and foster
the desired capital investment. Lines which might be abandoned with
a full and complete linear pricing system might not be abandoned with
linear pricing by commodity within origin and destination pairs but price
discrimination by commodity across origin and destination pairs.
A related issue concerns sequential abandonments of LDLs and their
system effects. If a line between A and B is abandoned, it will reduce
traffic between A and C, D,.... Similarly, it will reduce traffic between
B and C, D,.... Thus, the first abandonment increases the likelihood
that, say, a line between A and C, or A and D, or B and C, or B and D,
or indirectly between C and D, etc., will qualify for abandonment in the
future. It is an interdependent network system, no single component of
which can be judged in isolation. With interdependence, the condition
that P > MC on each line is no longer necessary for profit maximization,
constrained or unconstrained.
None of these comments suggest that Levin's basic conclusion, that
excess capacity is a primary source of unprofitability, is wholly erroneous.
They do suggest that care should be exercised before fully free abandon-
ment is encouraged. The carriers may, in fact, not have pursued persistent
efforts for abandonment for just these reasons, rather than those Levin
somewhat tortuously proposes. Managers may recognize varying elas-
ticities and the interdependence of their systems. Rather than pressing
for wholesale abandonments, they might rationally seek instead to relieve
their problems through more discriminatory (and, perhaps, more welfare-
inducing) pricing structures. Neither the theory nor the econometrics of
the paper covers these alternatives.